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A Vo,ce Of Afro-Am erican Op1nton

Double Issue. 40 cents

September-Octob er. 1976

Vol. 5. No. 5

Super K Rides Again
U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger
has achieved another spectacular effort
in international peace making. This time,
he has performed his miracle in southern
Africa. Within a matter of days, Kissinger
accompl ished what years of guerrilla
struggle could not . A peaceful se ttl ement
in amibia (South-West Afri ca) a.nd an
agreement for Black majority rule in
Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).
At least this is the conclusion that the
capitalist news med ia in this country
wou ld have us be lieve. Upon closer in:;peaion ho wever, the situation changes
i:lrastically. What we see is a group of
white racist and U.S. imperialists who are
trying to desperately save So ut h Africa
and themselves from total da mnation by
imposing a neo-colonial solution in Zimbabwe and split the southern African
liberation movements.
In recent years it did not seem as if the
U.S. had a foreign policy toward Africa,
but this is hardly the case. U.S. imperialist
policy has always been to keep Africa
within the grips of imperialism and to
support ands re ngthen racism and reaction. South Africa has always been the
main p illar of U.S. policy in Southern
Africa whi le the former Portuguese colonialists acted as U.S. proxy in Africa . The
most recent example of the U.S. sideing
with reaction and colonialism was their
open sup po rt of racism and rea ction in
Angol a. It was the U.S. who fin anced the
Portugue se in An gola an d the CIA that
created the F, LA and U ITA to figh t the
people s moveme n led by the M PLA. The
U.S. supported the So uth Africa n troops
under the old cold wa r (boague) of fi ghti r-ig communism while denouncing
So iet aid and the Cuban troops who
defended the right of the African people
to independence.
Socialist help of the MPLA to secure
and build a nation reflects the Leninist
principle o f the interconnection be,,.., een the fig ht fo r social ism and the fig ht
fo r na1ional li berati on. Th e principle
position of the Soviet L'nion, Cuba and
the other Socialist countries vis-a-vis

Angola has set another precedent in that
international progressive forces will unite
to fight imperialism. Despite the fact

MPLA was not backed by Western
powers they received world wide recognition as the one true liberation force
fighting for Angola's freedom.This was a
great setback for the U.S. and Kissinger's
foreign policy. The Vietnamese, the USSR
and the Cubans were being congratu!ated for their assistance to Angola. The
U.S. was lost, scorned and embittered.
fhere was nothing to do except pick up
the pieces.

a

IMPERIALIST SCHEMES

But the West had to do something.
SWAPO (South West People's Organization) and the guerrilla fighters i11 Zimbabwe were winning victory after victory.
The U.N . had already recognized SWAPO
as the only political force in Namibia. The
Ian Smith regime did not know how
much longer they could depend upon
the Black soldiers in their Rhodesian
army to continue to fight for them while
their brothers and sisters the freedom
fighters, were gaining victories for the
liberation of Zimbabwe. Colonialism was
being crushed from all sides. More importantly South Africa was losing the
ground to win friends in Africa through
its infamous racist detente policies. Plus

the two independent states of Angola
and Mozambique could now provide a
training ground for the freedom fighters
of South Africa and directly threaten
South Africa . President Samora Machel
of Mozambique made no bones about
telling the imperialist that Mozambique
and other African nations would come to
the aid of the liberation forces in southern Africa. Militarily the imperialist could
not win short of more aggressive military
action from the capitalist nations. Thus
they were forced with another tactic.
Diplomacy. What could be more diplo-

matic to save South Africa and racist rule
in Namibia and Zimbabwe than the U.S.
meeting with all sides to come to a
·'peaceful settlement" in Rhodesia and
Namibia? In ot her words the possibility
of sacrificing Rho desia and Na mib ia to
p reserve South Africa. Possibly they
~o~!d regai~ control in "legalized pirating and split the southern African liberation movements.
MIDDLE EAST "SOLUTION"

These were the reasons why Mr. Kissinger embarked on a "diplomatic
shuttle" to visit the heads of the African
states during the mid part of this year. He
denounced in mild terms apartheid, and
called for Black majority rule in Rho(Continued on page 4)

~as

•

The armed liberatio n struggle in Zimbab we
ha, taken on new dimens ion; through the
importa nt ad ·ance; made b, rhr- rreedom
figh ters o e1 tne fa eight months . Very linle
is known about the libeTation army in Zimbabwe since most of the attentio n has been
rocused on a political , e1tleme n1 of the Zimbaowe situatio n. Howe er. lt ~ because of-the
armed struggle and their success es that has
caused the discussion by the imperia list on
finding a polit,ca ! ,olurion 10 majoril ) rule in
Zimbab we. The fighting continu es in Zim~
babwe in spite of the Kissinge r so called
"shuttle diploma cy". Zimbab we will be llberated b, the strengt h of the war !or freedom
and n01 given 10 rhe Zimbab weans b\' Kiss in ger or Ian Smith. In the first oubl-ic co.mme nts
made by a membe r of the ieaders hip of the
Zimbab we People"s Army (ZIPA ). he MoLlm bique. Informa tion Agency [Al I imervie wed
Dz.inashe Machin gura, Deput} Political Com'missar of ZlPA. ZIPA is the organiz ation that is
carrying out thn war in Zimbab we against Ian
Smith's illegal regime and the followi ng interview is an abbrevi ated version given to AIM
l;ite in Sentem ber 197f; -rA

Q. What is the Zimba bw e People's Army
and how was it formed ?
A. The Zimba bwe People' s Army is .;
produc t of the voluntary merge r of the
militar y wing of the form er ZAN U
(ZA LA) and the militar y wing of the
former ZAP (ZIPRA ). I was forme d for
1he purpos e of rescuin g the Zimba bwe
libe.ra1ion stru_g_gle from1r echaot ic5itua tion that had been created by the ANC
leader ship. It is an armed body of men,
which was formed for the purpos e of
resumi ng the armed struggl e, intensi fying this armed struggl e .and carryin g it to
its logical conclu sion and finally establishing a just and popula r socio- politic al
order serving the interes ts o the people
of Zimba bwe.
After the Lusaka agreem ent in Decembe r 1974 the four nationa list organi sations fightin g for the libera tion of Zimbabwe came 1oge1her under one umbrella, the ANC. But in the course of
1ime, the leaders hip which was formed at
that time throug h the Lusaka agreem ent
fa il ed to organi se itself in negoti ating
with the Smith regime and failed 10 set in
motio n machin ery that would pursu e
and realise the liberat ion of Zimba bwe
throug h armed strugg le.
After th e fighters had reali ed the incompe tence of the A C leader shipth ey
took it upon themse lves to organi se
them elves, to recons titute themse l es
into an army that would fight for the
indepe ndenc e of the Zimba bwe people .
The comba tants from both former ZA U
and former ZAPU agreed to form a jo int
military comm. and that would lead the
armed struggl e. After this agreem en1
the approa ched the Liberat ion Committee of the Organ isation of African
Unity and the front-l ine Heads of State.

I

1,1

\i

c.. i'

r

n-1

c:::....E··. ~

"
uU
c-··,...

~

Q. Whar are che pol111 cal goals of the
51ru?g lel For e ·ample , ZIPA is figh ting
fo r freedo m bu1 ho\ do you defi ne this
freedo m?

who apprec i ated and active! suppo ned
this joint military comm and.
The joint milita ry comm and was
formed on he unders tandin g that the
liberat ion of Zimba bwe could only be
realise d throug h an arduou s armed
strugg le; second ly, on the unders tandin g
that the lraditio nal politic al leaaer ship of
Zim babwe had divide d the people of
Zimba bwe. And it becam e quite clear to
us that if we were e er going ro be able
to prosec ute a succes sfu l armed strugg le
we could not be a party to ei her of the
two rival ANC faction s, the Muzor ewa
faction or the Nkom o faction . We realised •hat the time for person ality politics had long passed . It was this approa ch
to po litics which had divide d the Zimbabwe people .
Q. Is ZIPA only an army, or does it have a
politic al structu re and leadership?

A. ZIPA is an army in the traditio nal
sense of the word. But ZIPA is a unique
and revolu tionary army in the sense that
it has a strateg ic role of transfo rming
itself into a politica l movem ent. The ZIPA
structu re accom modat es the shou ldering
of both the military and the pol itical tasks
of the revolu tion. We have, wi hin the
ZI PA structu re, a politica l depart ment
exclusi vely charg_ed with rhe respon sibility of should ering the politic al rasb that
are normal ly should ered by a revolu tionary politica l organiz .ation.
In the histor y of re olutio nary
struggl es we find eXamples that closely
approx imate our own situati on. For example, in the course of their stru gg les, at
one time or anothe r, depen ding on the
stage of their revolu tion, the politic al
leader ship was identic al to the military
leader ship of the organi sations fightin g
for freedo m in Ch in a, in Cuba, in Korea,'
in Vietna m and in many other countr ies.
But we have to establi sh a formal political structu re in order to give better
politic al direai on to the armed body that
is now fightin g inside Zimba bwe. And
mo es to do this are alread y well underway, moves lo transfo rm this organi sation
into a revolu tionary va ngu ard for the
people 's strugg e.

A. We are not mercen aries. We are not
simpl oldier . We are po litical soldier s.
We are fi ghtin for dearl define d politica l objecti ves. Our politica l goal is 10
overth row na1ional oppres sion in Zimbabwe , to put an end to the system ol
exploi tation of the many by the vew and
to create a system that w iil -e.rve the
people of Zimba bwe. When we sa. that
ZIPA is fightin g or freedo m we mean
that ZIPA is fightin g for politica l freedo m.
B politica l freedo m we mean that ZIPA
is fightin g for the politica l rights, he
econom ic rights and the cultura l rights of
the Zimba bwean people ; to put the
Zimba bwean people in a positio n of
au tho rity and in a positio n of domin ance
in these sphere s. Throug h realising the
people 's democ ratic freedo ms we release and set in motion the innova tive
and creativ e potent ial of the masses of
Zimba bwe.
Q. Has it been possib le to establish liberated or sem i -Liber ated zones in
Zimba bwe?
A. We can say that at this stage we have

manag ed to es abl ish sem i-libera ted
zones in the sense that, althou gh the
politica l and admini st rative. infrast ructure
is not yet fully organi sed, the enemr has
no contro l whatso e er in these are.as. The
masses are fully mobil ised and organi sed,
and are full y behind the armed strugg le
that is no being waged by the fr eedom
fighters. We also feel that establi shing
liberat ed areas a this stage would be
presen ting the enemy with many targets
vulner able to air strikes.

Q. /! is clear that since the beginn ing ol
this year the ZIPA forces have steppe d up
the armed struggle. Has chis been done
only in terms of the geogra phical area
affecte d by the war, tha1 is to sa y, is ir
only a matLer of extend ing the war to ci
wider area, or has the war been intensified in the sen.Se of achiev ing higher
comba t effectiveness?
A. It is true that there has been consid er-

able expans ion of the geogra phical area
covere d by our guerril la struggl e. But the
quanti tative growth of the war has also
gi en rise to the qualita tive develo pment
and transfo rmatio n o f this same war. This
has becom e necess ary in accord ance
with the change s in the enemy 's situa tion. The enemy is now genera lly on the
defensi e . The enemy has now emplo yed
the stra egy of not dispers ing its forces,
so as to minim ise the danger of ambus hes
on patrols and to minim ise the danger s of
surpri.5e attacks on small encam ped units
wirhou t perma nent fortific ation. This has
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deplo: ib force;, ir. bi; rnr.,c,vs. To continue the \\·ar we have to de,elo p it to a

siace of attacki ng the garriso ned enemy ,
and to raise the level oi tactics to ambu,hi n large enem\ con,oy ~. Tnere-1ore
there \•,·as an 1mpe ra11,e need 1or d quail ative change in our tru1;gl e . Th is we
have realise d and carried o u thro ugh
opera1ing in bigger miiitary un its, which
has been impossible beca use of the
qu alitat i e develo pment of the. consciousn ess oi rhe masses , who are serving
as our camou flage. as our intellig ence
system and as our quarter master s.
Q. But hundre ds of thousands of p eople
have been moved imo concen tration
camps in Zimba bwe. This mun create
proble ms when the people wan co help
the guerril las. How do Lhe fi hiers and
the- people deal with this problem?

A. Mass partici pation and mass suppor t
in guerril la warfare is an indispe nsable
condit ion for victory. It is the strateg k
aim of the Smith regime, like its predece~ors in Vietna m, Mozam biq ue , Angola and other coun tries, to try to isolate
the guerril las from the masses by establish ing concen tration camps , the socalled "prote cted villages" . Howev er, the
Smith regime has now overta xed its man power to such an extent that it doesn' t
have adequ ate manpo wer to police the
concen tration camps . So there are always
loopho les.
O ur struggl e is a popula r strugg le, and
it enjoys abund ant suppor t from the
broad masses of the Zimba bwean people. We have a fairly large army, which
runs into thousa nds. Withou t the suppor t
of the masses it would be very difficult to
mainta in such a big army. We get food,
clothin g and whatev er kind of assistance
we need from the masses. Some govern ments find it a burden to mainta in an
army onl half the size of ours. But we are
capabl e of mamta ining this army becaus e
of the suppor t we get from the broad
masses of the people .
Smith regime ' s war communiq ues annou nce their casualties in
terms o( one or two deaths in an act.ion.
They have never admitt ed losing more
than five soldiers in a single day. Does
this bear any relatio n to the real situation?

Q. The

ot at all. It is merely a camou flage to
disguis e their losses. If they were 10 admit
the truth it would demor alise their supporters and their fighters. So they try as
much as possib le to minim i5e their losses
and at the same time to exagge rate those
of the guerril las.

A.

Q. There have been some reports about

Israeli militar y co-ope ra rion with the
-Smith regime . Have you any concre te
inform ation about this?

A. It is not only the Israelis who are cooperat ing with the Smith racist regime in
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fr "l"' a ,a~ie;, o' \\,·,;::--,,. cour,tr ;e, ,·,ho
are- acti-.el\ a~~1mrig iht Srr,ith r~girne in
oppre .,;n ' 1he Zimbab~~ ean people . So
we don't ~ee th is in isol ation \o\e know ,
we ha·,e e\ idence 1ha; there are merce n aries irom Israel and ma nv other cou ntries o perati ng with Smith agai nst us.
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sing miliions and mil lio•h of people in it,
own countr y. The) I\OU id do better w
make use of the money in alleviating the
econom ic burden of the broad rr.asses in
their own countr ,, who live a liie far
worse than that of Rhode sian whites.

Q. Ooe5 Zf PA ro da y have any relario nship to the traditio nal nation alist organisa tions oi Zimba bwe?

Q. Do you think anythi ng will come our

A. ZIPA is not in negation to the former

A. They are definit e! · "shuni lng'' with a

traditio na l oreani sations in Zimba bwe.
What Z.IPA ai-;m at is assimilating , synthesing and espous ing the progre ssive
revolu tionary conten t of these former
organi sations .
Q . \l\lhar is the basis of disuni ty among
the former leaders of the nation alist
org_anisarions? Is it tribal, politica l or
what?

A. As far as we are conce rned, the basis
.of disunit y among the former leader s of
the nationa list organi zation s is politic al
ambiti on and power strugg le, though this
might manife st itself as tribal differe nces
or polit1cal differe nces. Tribal, in the
sense tha1 in creatin g a power base they
seek to place people . belong ing to their
own ethnic group in key positio ns, in
strateg ic positio ns, so as to prepar e a
secure power base which serves as a
spring board ro gain politic al ascend ance.
This disunit y also manif em itself politically, inasmu ch as they put forwar d political slogan s to try to win rhe suppo rt of
the broad masses of the people . But we
should e~pha sise that 1heir differe nces
are e~sentially not ideolo gical at alt.
Ideolog ically they belong IO the same
camp.
Q. An econom ic plan has been dra'l.vn

up with the collab oration of the United
Stales govern ment conce rning econo mic
guaran tees for seHler5" after 1he forma tion of an African govern mem in Zimbabwe . What are your views on this plan?
A. First of al!, this so-call ed econo mic
plan is a direct result of the intensi fica-

tion of the armed strugg le in Zimba b\ e.
The Un ited States and other imperi alist
power s see their interes ts threate ned and
the are determ ined to stamp out the
revolu tionar flame before it 1s too late.
The so-call ed econo mic plan aims at
creatin g a socio- econom ic climat e conducive to the contin ued exploi tation of
the Zimba bwean people under "majo rity" rule.
e are to ally oppos ed to the so -called
econom ic plan. 11 falls far shor of our obe are not fightin g for econjectives.
l reform s. We are fighting
politica
omic or
for the total transfo rmatio n of the Zimbabwe an society.
To us the econo mic plan is doubly
ridicul ous. First, the United States wishes
to pay compe nsatio n to the racists for the
termin ation of their exploi tation. Sec-

of Kissinger's and Vorster's
diplom acy" in Africa?

"shutt le

purpos e, workin g o u t a plan tci sabota ge
our struggl e. \P\e 1hink the) will produc e
some formul a aime.d at conta ining the
struggl e. But we are prepar ed for them
and we are quite sure that whatev er they
do will fail. All their schem es will be
stillbor n.
Q. Wh at is ZIPA's attitud e toward s elements in the traditio nal leaders hip of the

Zimba bwe nationa list movem ent who

compr omise themselves by suppo rting
imperia list plans Lo contin ue the system
of exploi tation after majori ty rule?
A. We are not racialists. We are not fight-

ing against the Smith regime simply because they are white. We are fighting
agains t the system that they are perpetrating and defend ing. If any Zimba bweans collud e with them in oppres sing
the Zimba bwean people we shall bundle
them togeth er, we shall make no distinc tion on the basis of colour .
Q. How far has ZIPA gone in organi sing
a politic al infrast ructure inside. Zimbabwe to mobilis e the people ?
A. The masses are organi sed in units and
they are democ ratical ly conduc ting their
day-to -day busine ss under the leaders hip
o f ZIPA. In each uni we ha1.•e a section of
dedica ted people and we ha e also managed to establi sh mass organi sations- for
studen ts, for childr en, for wome n,
peasan ts and worker s.
Q. Does this politic al structu re extend
into the cities?
A. Our strateg y has been that of fightin g
from the countr yside, encircl ing the
cities. as far as the rural areas are concerned , this structu re is quite organi sed.
But becaus e of the existing condit ions it
has not been possib le for these organi sations to come out into the open in the
cities. They are still clande stine. But they
are there.

Q. What about the possib ilities for urban
guerril la struggle?
A. We do not concei ve of urban guerill a
warfar e as being divorc ed from the
guerril la war we ar e carrying out in the
countr yside. Urban guerrilla arfare can
only play a supple mentar y role to the
guerril la opera ions organi sed in the
countr yside.
(comin ued on page 6)
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dcsia. But it \\as too l;;:e. E-.en .. r.:ode:ate
states·· like Nigeria and Ghana saw
through his feeble attempts and did not
meet with him. Ho\\ did the L;.S. expect
anyone to believe that they \\ere willing
to end apartheid while at the same time
they were dramatically accelerating the
amount of new trade and investments in
South Africa? Plus to many African
leaders the Kissinger shuttle ·~ndicated
that one of the purposes of his trip was to
split the liberations movements and to
create a situation similar to the Midde
East. One of the main results of Kissinger's "Shuttle Diplomacy" to the Middle
East in 1975 was a split in the Arab
Liberation Movements which is indicated
in today's war in Lebanon.
Un Aprrl 24, 197b, Henry Kissinger
revealed the major portion of a ten point
plan to force Rhodesia into Black majority rule. The Black nations of Africa as
well as the Black Congressional Caucus
dared Kissinger to implement his plan
and specifically the points that called for
the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and
the tightening of sanctions against the
Rhodesian economy. The liberation
forces had no need to settle for anything
less than the immediate transfer of
power. They saw through the Ford administration's 'worry' about giving them
"assistance to a secure future" and its
'concern' for the civil rights of white
Rhodesians as another stalling tactic.
Throughout the summer as the sense
of drama grew, Mr. Kissinger talked with
various Africans as well as kept in close
contact with South African Prime Minister, John Vorster. The news media reported that Mr. Kissinger would not meet
with Ian Smith of Rhodesia unless Smith
conceded to the fact that he would have
to accept the future of Black majority
rule. The African leaders of the border
line countries who had met to discuss
their role in the future of southern Africa
and whether they would unite to fight
the colonialist and their allies greeted
Mr. Kissinger's plan with skepticism. Mr.
Kissinger met with these leaders indi idually. The resu lts were either bad or good
depending upon which part of the news
item you read.
NEW STRATEGY
As the daily press continued to try to
confuse the American public, steps were
taken to completely disregard the ten
points that Kissinger had established
earlier. If Kissinger's plan was adopted
the racists would lose too much. Under
the new strategy, no one would have to
"force " Rhodesia to give up power. The
white minority would seemingly "volunteer" it. The drama heightened when
Prime Minister Ian Smith asked the Rhodesian government for permission to
meet with Mr. Kissinger. As the world
held its breath, the Rhodesian government gladly gave its consent to Mr.
Smith, who coincidently was scheduled
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to attend a rugb\ same in "0utl-. Africa
the Sunda} Mr . Ki ,, inscr \\ as meeting in
C2pe Town . After a fe\, hours of deliberation. /\1r Smith said \ha: he would get
back with Mr. Kissinger in a fev. davs. He
first had to discuss the new plan with his
countrymen.
Friday, September 24, 1976, Ian Smith
appeared before Rhodesian television
audiences and said that he accepted the
following points in his negotiations with
•
Mr. Kissinger.
"1 . Rhodesia agrees to majorjty 'wvithin

two years .
2. Representatives of the Rhodesian
government will meet immediately
at a mutually agreed place with
African leaders to organize an
interim government to function
until majority rule is implement,,~

..:
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enab:in:; iegi,lati;n for the process
to majority rule . Upon enactment
of that legislation, Rhodesia will
also enact such legislation as may
be necessary to the process.

5. Upon the establishment of the
interim government, sanctions will
be lifted and all acts of war, including guerrilla Warfare, will cease.
6. Substantial economic support will
be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesians about the
economic future of the country. A
trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia which will organize
and finance a major international
effort to respond to the economic
opportunities of this country and
to take effects of the changes
taking place. The fund will , inter
alia, support the internal and external economic circumstances of
the country and provide developmental assistance guarantees and
investment incentives to a wide
variety of projects.
The aim will be to expand the
industrial and mineral production
of the country, to enhance agricultural potential by suitable land
utilization and development programs and to provide the necessary training and educational facilities to provide the essential flow of
skills.

3. The interim government should'
consist of a council of state, half of
whose members will be black and
half white with a white chairman
without a special vote. The European and African sides would
nominate their representatives. It's
functions will include:
Legislation-general supervisory
responsibilities-and supervising the process of dr.afting the
constitution.
The interim government should
also have a council of ministers
with a majority of Africans and
an African first minister. For the
period of the interim government, the ministers of defense
and of law and order would be
white. Decisions of the council
of ministers to be taken by twothirds majority. Its functions
should include: delegate legislative authority and execute responsibility.

Pension rights, the investment of
the individual in his own home
and/or farm and the remittances
overseas of an individual's liquid
resources with the levels yet to be
stipulated will be guaranteed by
the interim and subsequent governments. These particular measures will be underwritten by the
trust fund thereby giving a firm

international base to the government guarantee."
WHITE RULE MAINTAINED
Is this or is this not an attempt to do
egal pirating of the right to self-deter.·nination of the Zimbabwean peoples?
Kissinger's plan is nothing but a blatant
~tep to neo-colonialism. A trust fund set
up outside of Rhodesia so that the racists
will have total control. Continued expansion of industrial and mineral production
so that the capitalists countries can rape
the land of all its resources for their
profit. White Rhodesians have nothing to
lose for their "sacrifice" of Black majority
rule. They will be paid to settle in the
Republic of South Africa if they wish to
strengthen the racist system there. (This
will only give them a little extra time
because the African National Congress
(ANC] will be victorious in South Africa.)
/Continued on page 8)
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A Slack mayor ca lied for the formation
of a ''Biack Think Tank"----intellectuals
and A.frican exoert,----to formulate a solution for sou ihern- Africa. A p rom inent
Black mini3ter wanted "to take a ea rn of
journalists. ministe1>, labor leaders and
poli1idans to 50U1h Africa , to see first
hand what is happening." A group of
concerned college students organized a
collection to aid South African refugees
fleeing to Bo~wana "because it's the
on ly place he can go."
All these effom indicate both the concern and the confusion regarding the
role of Afro-Americans in relation to the
struggles in southern Africa.
As Afro-Americans , we do have a respomibility----in fact, an obligation- to
do whatever is in our po er 10 help our
brothers and sisters -gain their freedom.
9ut we must at the same time be clear on
exactly where our responsibilities lie and
how we can be most effective in our aid.
It is important to realize that we, American citizens, will not liberate Afri ca. This
is the thing neither Henry Kissinger nor
some Afro-Americans seem to understand. The liberation movements of
South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe
have been waging war for many years
and on many levels. They are the only
forces which have a mandate from the
African masses to win their freedom,
whether by negotiation, armed struggle
or both. It is they, not Kissinger or a
"Black Think Tank," who will determine
how freedom will come and what form it
will take. Therefore, Afro-Americans
must recognize the true libera!ion forces
(those recognized by the United Nations
( . .) and the Organization of African
Unity (O.A.U .) and a/low them to determine how we can best serve their needs.
We must work to influence the American
public to support the liberation movements of Southern Africa an d to pressure
the U.S. Government to withdraw its
support of the white racist regimes of
Southern Africa. The liberation movements, through their United
atlons
spokespersons, have already asked very
specific things ol those who are concerned and wish to provide aid. They
have asked for the complete isolation of
the Rhodesian and South African governments from the world community until
liberation is achieved. We must realize
that the United States and the other capitalist countries are the primary reason
that South Africa and Rhodesia continue
to exist and oppress the Black majority by
its suppQrt o f lan Smith and John orster.
This means thar one of our tasks is to
organize pressure groups to get U.S. corporations out of South frica. We must
pressure the U.S. government to end
diplomatic ies wi h, and eliminate mon erary support for, the ors1er and Smith
regimes. We must emphatically and effe.cti ely prate t cultural exchanges with
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Soutn l\frica. panirniarl. when AfroAmerican entertainers and sports figures
are invo!\ ed. Re\. Jes,e Jackson of PUSH
,-.an:s to conduct a "iact finding" tour to
?outh Africa. The proposed trip is a slap
in the face to the liberation movement of
South Africa, which has already made all
the facts available for anyone who is
interes_t~d. The proposed trip is in direct
oppos1t1on to the liberation movement's
plea for total isolation of South Africa.

of southern Africa depends for its survival. It was South Africa which enabled
Portugese colonialism to survive as Io n <
as it did. It is South Africa that J... •p
Rhodesia from economic collapse when
U.N. sanctions were applied. It is South
Africa that illegally holds Namibia in its
clutches. In fact. the whole reason for
Kissinger's trip to South Africa is to bu
time for South Africa, to allow that government to become stronger and better
a ble o resist the re volutionary suroe that
s engulfing southern Africa . Whe~"'south
'\frica goes under. so wi ll the institution
Jf colonia li sm .
e must constantlv and
:onspicuously through public pressure
·emind Mr. Kissinger et al, that a "Rho::Jesian solution" will not solve the major
problems in southern Africa . Only the
destruction of the Vorster regime and the
apartheid system will do that and immediate majority rule in Rhodesia and
South Africa.
OUR RESPONSIBILITIES

SOUTH AFRICA IS THE PROBLEM

The liberation movements have also
requested monetary aid-to buy arms,
food and other necessities. The group of
students who organized a campaign to
collect money to assist South African
refugees in Botswana were earnest and
concerned, but somewhat misguided.
Aid to refu~ees can only be a stop-gap
measure. Aid to the African National
Congress of South Africa (South Africa's
only liberation movement) would have a
much broader impact. Helping refugees
only helps eliminate one of the surface
probl_erns ~f oppression. Contributing to
~he liberation forces would go directly
into the effort to eradicate colonialism
and would help eliminate the need fo;
South Africans to flee their rightful
homelands.
One must realize that the crux of the
southern African problem is South Africa
itself. The liberation movements of
sou_thern Afri_ca, though fighting to free
the_1r r_espect1ve countries, have always
maintained that South Africa is the bastion on which the racist colonial system

The liberation forces represent a
people's movement, and are the spokespersons of the oppressed people that in
che end will be victorious. Angola,
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have
shown the effectiveness of a movement
based on the people and not on a
"Kissinger Plan" or puppet movements
and South Africa will prove no exception.
In Angola, it is a well-documented fact
that the CIA created puppet" revolutionary" organizations to try to split the
Angolan people. They were unsuccessful. It will be up to us to insure that South
African and Rhodesia's counterparts to
Jonas Savimbi's UNITA and Holden
Roberto's FNLA are not created in the
payroll of the U.S. federal government.
As Afro-Americans, we also have a
responsibility to ourselves: to relate the
effect U.S. policies abroad have on our
~v:'n situation. U.S. unemployment i!
ming,_ bu~ U.S. corporations are locating
factories in southern Africa (and other
nations with facist regimes) because o1
the extremely cheap labor supply. Oui
taxes ar~ rising but the U.S. is pumping
mone_y, in the form of loans, weapons
mach_inery and technology, into the op·
press1ve southern African regimes. ThE
contradiction of the American position i!
very clear: supposedly, the U.S. is working for majority rule and equal rights for
all Rhodesian and South African citizens
?ut cannot guarantee the same rights t~
its own.
Our responsibility is full support of the
southern African liberation movements
an~. ~ot with any U.S. government plan;
to Liberate Southern Africa." Our responsibility is not to support U.S. imperialism but to support the world-wide
str~ggle against capitalist exploitation
racism and U.S. agression.
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Q. \'\:hat does ZIPA see as the objecti\,e
of the recent Rhodesian massacre of
more than 670 Zimbabwean refugees at
Nyazonia in Mozambique ?
A. Prin cipally, to international ise the
conflia. They hoped that the People's
Republ ic of Mozamb ique would read
rash ly and invade Rhodesia, which ould
ha\e created a pretext lor Smith to call
for support from his Western allies.
At the same time the attack was also
aimed at creating a rift between Frelimo
and the Zimbabwean freedom fighters. It
was meant to show that by supporting
the Zimbabwean freedom fighters and
accommodat ing Zimbabwean · refugees
the Mozambican Government is actually
inviting attacks by the Smith regime. The
idea was to force the Mozambican Government to oppose the guerrillas by creating the idea that in an all-out war between Mozambique and Rhodesia , th e
young People's Republic would stand to
lose.
Q. Many Zimbabwean s are fighting in
the Smith regime's army. Why, and what
is ZIPA's attitude to them? And are any of
them deserting to join the Guerrillas?

A. It is true that thousands of Zimbabweans are fighting in the racist regime's
armv. This is because of blackmail and
con~cription. The people are blackmailed into serving the Smith regime in
search of social security. They want to
guarantee the security of their families,
They want to earn a livelihood and have
no alternative, wi1h all other employment opportunitie s denied them, but to
serve within the racist army. It has also
become dear of late that the Smith regime is conscripting Africans into its army
by force.
ZJPA's attitude is that those who join
Smith's arm}' are misguided Zimbabweans. The y need to be doubl libera ed.
Firsi th e y need to be liberated from the
national oppression. They are oppressed
just like an y other Zimbabwean . Secondly, they need to be libera ed from the
oppression they suffer within the raci st
army. They occupy an inferior position in
the racist army. So we sympathise with
them. Our struggle is t o liberate all oppressed Zimbabwean s in Zimbabwe today.
Recentl y the number of deserters from
the racist army joining the ZIPA ranks has
risen to astronomical proportions. Hundreds and hundreds of them come to our
ranks. Some of them with their weapons.

Q. You said the black soldiers in the
Rhodesian racist army are discriminate d
against. In what way? ·
A. About a couple of months ago the

Smi th regime published the report at a
commission o f inquir 1 in o racial discrimination. This re ealed qu ite cand id!
that the African soldiers in Smith's army

C""'
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ocrup~ a \ ~r~ inierior position in he
en e that up to no v none of them ha
risen to th e position of an officer. all of
:hem are either nnn -commis ioned officers or simply privates. So this in itself is
tantamount to exploitation.
In addition, there is racial discimination within the army itself. Some facilities
that are available to whites are not available to African soldiers. And also European private !iOldiers do not !>how respect 10 their -seniors who are Africans.
In the Rhodesian racist army today, the
most dangerous tasks are assigned to the
Africans and , in most cases, the African
soldiers are used as minesweepe rs and as
reconnaisanc e personnel for the racist
army. But of course the racist army also
mistrusts the African soldiers very much.
They doubt their loyalty. As such they
cannot give them freedom of action to
organise action against the guerrillas.
They can only work under the supervision of their white superiors.

Q. How does ZIPA define the enemy?
What is the target of the freedom
fighter's bullets?

A. Clear· understandin g of the character

of our society, the nature of our revolution and the fundamental contradiction
in o ur ociety i essemial to the definition
of the enemy. O ur societ is es~en ially a
colon ial society and as such e have to
wage a national democratic revolution to
o erthrow national oppression. This national democratic revolution will serve to
reconcile the principal contradiction in
Zimbabwe which is characterised by the
domination and oppression of the vast
majority of the Zimbabwean people by a
small, minority, racist, reactionar)' clique
of whites.
From this we can say that all those who
are opposed to 1h e liberation and the
independen ce o f the Zimbabwea n
people are our enemies. These comprise
the Smith racist regime, and the imperial ist powers that back it, puppet Africans
serving the Smith regime, and all those
who are opposed to the independenc e
of the Zimbabwean people. The target of
the freedom fighters' bullets is the system
of exploitation and 1he capitalist enterprises and armed personnel which servE.
to perpetuate it.
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pie's Republic of Angola in the United
J\:ations.
3. We of the CBTU believe that unless
progress toward black majority rule is
achieved the United States government
should stop all economic, political, cultural, and sporting relations with South
Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia.

The tollov- ing resolutions were passed bv thl
Coali1ion oi Black Trade Unionist, ICBTU\ at
their fifth annual comention held in Cleveland,. Ohio on Sept . 3-6, 1976. The CBTU
represents ove 50 un ion; both in the AFL-CIO
and other inde oen dem unions of Black union
leadership and 'rank and file members. -Ed.

RESOLUTION NO. 28
WHITE MINORITY GOVERNMENTS
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
WHEREAS: Southern Africa has commanded the attention of the world because of the suppression of Black majority rights in Rhodesia, Nam ibia and South
Africa - five million Black people in
Rhodesia, two million Blacks in Namibia
and · eighteen millio n Black So ut h Africans are denied political, economic and
human rights by the racist and rep ressive
rule of the white minority gove rn ments
of Rh odesia and So uth Africa; and

~
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.WHEREAS: the Rhodesian government ;,- ·-; :., ·-..
' r
is not recognized by any government in ~the world as being legitim~te, and it l !. •
continues to defy the resolutions of the ~
fi, f
United Nations and the Organization of
African Unity which call for Black major- .~ ~ .. ·-~ • ...,
ity rule in Rhodesia. Further, the racist
Rhodesian government is militarily engaged in fighting the liberation movements in that country and invading the
bordering independent country of Mozambique in an attempt to suppress the
national liberation movement; and

l

white
minority government is illegally ruling
the country of Namibia against the mandate of the United Nations and Organization of African Unity and against the will
of the Namibian people; and

WHEREAS : the South African

WHEREAS: the people of Angola recently wo n their freedom from Portuguese colon ialism on ovembe r 11, 1975
d espite the aggressive attem p ts b the
South Afri can governmen , t he United
States governm en and other co un t ries to
prevent that achievement by invad i ng
A ngo la and supporti ng the CI A su bversive m aneuvers and m ercenaries wh i ch
w ere responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths and wi despread devastation of property.
THEREFORE BE IT RESOlVED THAT:
1. We of the CBTU call for Black
majority rule in Rh o desia, Namibia, and
South Africa, and that the trade union
movement in the United States call upon
the United States government to support
and work for achieving Black majority
rule in Southern Africa.
2. We of the CBTU call upon the
United States government to recognize
and establish diplomatic relations with
the People's Rep ublic of A ngola and for
the United States to recognize the Pea-

I

WHEREAS Over 120 countries voted in
the 1974 General A,semblv of the United
Nations to expel South Africa from the
U .N. because of its continued violation of
every human right and trade union right
of the African workers guaranteed in the
United Nations Charter; and
WHEREAS Wages paid by U.S. companies to Blacks in South Africa remain at
levels far below wages paid to whites
performing similar work ,

THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT :
1. We of the CBTU condemn the
' murder of the unarmed peaceful demonstrators by the South African government
police as they prot~s~ed non-violently f~r
~ basic human political and economic
1
rights;
..,
2. We of the CBTU express full support
of the just struggle of the Black South
African people and the conclusion that
the only solution for beace in South
Africa is the ending of the inhumane
system of apartheid and the establishment of majority rule;
3. We of the CBTU join with the
United Nations and the Black people of
South Africa in recognizing and supporting the African National Co ngress (ANC)
of South Africa as the leg itimate voice of
the oppressed South African majority;
4. We of the CBTU call upon the trade
union movement in the United States to
vigorously condemn the apartheid system and the murder of Black South Africans;
5. We of the CBTU call for the withdrawal of United States corporations' investments in the Republic of South Africa.

~
1

THEREFORE BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED

RESOLUTION NO. 37-41
THE CURRENT SITUATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA
WHEREAS Over 300 unarmed Black
South Africans have been murdered in
the Republic of South Africa since June
of 1976 by South African police while
participating in non-violent peaceful
demonstrations for their rights; and
WHEREAS United States foreign poli:ies regarding Southern Africa are being
formulated with very little advice or
counsel from Afro-Americans; and
WHEREAS Having examined the material on apartheid in the Republic of South
Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) especially with regards to the situation of
African workers and United States companies in Southern Africa; and
WHEREAS After studying the United
Nations' reports on trade union activity
in South Africa and the reports of the
International Labor Organization of the
United Nations; and

THAT:
1. We of the CBTU support efforts to
give Afro-Americans direct and meaningful input into the formulation of U.S.
foreign policy toward Southern Africa
through formal and informal discussions
between Afro-American leaders, the Secretary of State and other foreign policy
makers;
2, We of the CBTU support the right of
Black South African workers to forrr
trade unions of their choice to elect thei1
leaders and to bargain collectively with
their employers;
3. We of the CBTU support the right of_
Black South African workers to form
trade unions of their choice to elect their
leaders and to bargain collectively with
their employers;
3. We of the CBTU support the nonbanned South African .Congress of Trade
Unions (SACTU) the only trade union
movement that is recognized by the
Black South Africans and the United
Nations;
(continued on page 8)
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1. Socialism and the '\e1,\ ly lndependenr
Natiom, by R. A. \'lyanovsky, Imported Publications, 320 West Ohio
St., Chica o 60670. Price: $4.00. An
outline of the concepts and problems
of national liberation movements and
non-capitalist development and their
relations to the socialist world.

SL:PER K RIDES AGAIN

There is no seventh point that guarantees
such econo;nic rewards for the Zimbab\\E-can majority for ha\ in" to suffer with
white rule for all these y;ars Each step is
a sham from one to six. It did not take the
other southern African nations two years
to have a complete transfer of power. In
2. Economic Neo-Colonialism, by L.I.
two years, many things could happen.
Kolchkovsky, Imported Publications,
There is no rationale for a council with a
fifty percent white membership in a naChicago, Price: $3.50. A systematic
examination of the wide variety of
tion that is overwhelmingly African. The
methods used by modern neocouncil should be a true republic with
colonialists, their internal contradicthe number of representatives reflecting
tions and the newly independent
the population. There is absolutely no
countries' struggle against them.
need for a white person to head a council
is going to shape the future of a
that
Autobio(The
3. They Shall Nol Pass
nation. There is absolutely no need
black
graphy of La Pasionaria), b Dolores
Minister of Law and Order and
the
for
381
lbarruri, International Publishers,
of Defense to be white (unMinister
the
Park Ave., South N.Y.C. 10016. The
Kissinger you are intent
Mr.
like
less,
story of one of the most famous
white minority power).
prolonging
upon
Spanish Communists and her struggle
was no input by the
there
that
fact
The
fascism.
wi;h the working class against
this document
makes
forces
liberation
The book is also a call to the future to
unorincipled
criminal,
most
the
among
'
the young people of Spain.
and benighted documents e ,e'r. The fact
that it calls for an end to international
sanctions and cessation of guerrilla warSubscribe Today!
fare, makes it ridiculous. If this is the
proposa l the capitalist countries present
AFRICAN AGENDA
to bring about a peaceful transition.
P.O.Boa: 1941
continued warfare is assured.
Chago. Ill. 10690
Kissinger and Ford have f~oled no one
Enclosed ,s my check or money order of $2 00 with their non-attempt to 'establish' the
for • one year subscription made payable to
nations of Zimbabwe and Namibia. This
·:t,e Afric#I Agenda.
:~Ian will be criticized by the in.ternaName _ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ __
·~:>n_al c?mn:,unity _that sees through
K1~smger s d,plomat1c guise. As Cuban
~ress _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ __
Prime Minister Fidel Castro stated "I
think all these maneuvers are mean~ to
C~ - - -- - -- - -- - - -- - save something to prolong the racist
r~gim;, in Zimbabwe for as long as pos~
State _ _ __ _ __ __ _ Zip _ _
He further said that Henry
s1_bl~.
The African Agenda is published by thto At,~
was trying to get "some kind of
Kissinger
organi-
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can Solidarity Comm1nee, a non-profit
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and organizations that order a bulk number of
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t .. e talks. "At least the fact that the') 1the
R_hodes1an gov~rnment) had to recognize the necessity for majority rule is a
revolutionary victory ... This victory was
not achieved by peaceful means, but
through armed struggle, so why should
the guerrilla movements disarm now ... it
is logical that the Africans will not accept
the plan. The revolutionaries are in the
better position ~?w. Why should they
accept the cond1t1ons set up by a racist
~overnment which will keep control of
:he army and the police? ... who knows
what may happen in two years?"

(Continued from page lJ

Black Trade Unionists
4. We of the CBTU call upon the tradt
~nio~ movement to take a strong position m condemning the recent brutal
killing of Black South Africans and that
the trade union movement in the U.S.
should state its support for majority rule
in South Africa;
_ 5. We of the CBTU call for the expulSJOn of the Republic of South Africa from
the United Nations;
6. We of the CBTU call for the boycott
of diamonds and other metals from
South Africa into the U.S.;
7. We of the CBTU call upon the Cong.
Black Caucus to hold public hearings in
the U.S. on the situation in South Africa
and on U.S. policy in South Africa;.
8. We of the CBTU will make a monetary contribution to the United Nation~
Aid and Defence Fund for the victims ot
apartheid.

Editor
Dinohi,
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